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Metaphysics of Quantity and the Limit of Phenomenal Concepts 
[penultimate draft: forthcoming in Inquiry] 
Abstract. Quantities like mass and temperature are properties that come in degrees. And those 
degrees (e.g. 5 kg) are properties that are called the magnitudes of the quantities. Some philoso-
phers (e.g., Byrne 2003; Byrne & Hilbert 2003; Schroer 2010) talk about magnitudes of phe-
nomenal qualities as if some of our phenomenal qualities are quantities. The goal of this essay is 
to explore the anti-physicalist implication of this apparently innocent way of conceptualizing 
phenomenal quantities. I will first argue for a metaphysical thesis about the nature of magnitudes 
based on Yablo’s proportionality requirement of causation. Then, I will show that, if some phe-
nomenal qualities are indeed quantities, there can be no demonstrative concepts about some of 
our phenomenal feelings. That presents a significant restriction on the way physicalists can ac-
count for the epistemic gap between the phenomenal and the physical. I’ll illustrate the restric-
tion by showing how that rules out a popular physicalist response to the Knowledge Argument. 
[word count excluding footnotes: 7028] 
Keywords: Quantity; Proportionality of Causation; Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
1 What are Magnitudes?  1
There are two kinds of properties: those which are quantities and those which are not. Roughly 
speaking, quantities come in fine-grained degrees, and non-quantitative properties do not. Being 
prime is non-quantitative because an object is either prime or not. The property does not come in 
degrees. Temperature is, however, a quantity. An object does not just have temperature; it has 
temperature to a certain degree. The same is true for mass, temporal duration, etc. Those degrees 
of a quantity are magnitudes of the quantity. For example, being 5 kg is a magnitude. 
 In this essay, I assume realism about magnitudes. That is, I take the magnitudes of a quanti-
ty like all the degrees of temperature to be properties that are (i) out there in the world, (ii) not 
constructed by our measurement practices, and (iii) not reducible to comparative relations among 
objects (e.g. the relation of less-than-or-equal-to-with-respect-to-mass).  2
 A quantity (e.g., temperature) and its magnitudes (e.g., all the degrees of temperature) stand 
in a determinable-determinates relation. But not all determinates of a quantity are magnitudes of 
that quantity. The degrees of a quantity are maximally determinate ways to instantiate that 
 I received a lot of help writing this paper. I couldn’t thank Ross Cameron enough for not only comment1 -
ing on an earlier draft of this paper but also agreeing to supervise my dissertation that grew out of the 
ideas in this paper. I’m very grateful to Harold Langsam for his extensive comments and suggestions 
about my arguments, and for convincing me that there is something worth pursuing in the very first ver-
sion of this paper. My gratitude also goes to James Cargile, Matt Duncan, Brie Gertler, Trenton Merricks, 
Andrew Morgan, Walter Ott, and Nick Rimell for patiently commenting on numerous versions of this pa-
per; those conversations and feedback pushed me to think about the issue harder and articulate my reason-
ing more clearly. And this paper wouldn’t have been half as readable as it is without Stacie Thyrion’s gen-
erous help in tidying up my English. Finally, I would like to thank my audience for their valuable com-
ments when I presented earlier drafts of this paper at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Cambridge Uni-
versity and the anonymous reviewer of this journal for very helpful suggestions.
 The reductive, nominalist theory of quantity is developed in Ellis (1966), Forge (1987), Bigelow & Par2 -
getter (1988), and recently Dasgupta (2013). For the difficulties of a nominalist theory of quantity and 
various ways in which a theory of quantity based on magnitude realism can be developed, see for instance 
Swoyer (1987), Mundy (1987), Armstrong (1988), and Eddon (2013).
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quantity. The following example supports this claim: Whereas being at 50 degrees Fahrenheit is 
a magnitude of temperature, being somewhere around 50 degrees Fahrenheit is a determinate but 
not a magnitude of temperature. By instantiating being 50 degrees Fahrenheit and being some-
where around 50 degrees Fahrenheit, a glass of water does not thereby have two magnitudes of 
temperature. 
 Furthermore, not every further specification gives us a determinate of a determinable. For 
example, being crimson is a determinate of redness; although being crimson and poisonous is 
more specific than simply being red, it is not a determinate of redness, i.e., not a more determi-
nate way to be red. I do not have an analysis/definition of the determinable-determinate relation. 
In this paper, I rely largely on our intuitive understanding of it.  3
2 Some Phenomenal Qualities are Quantities 
Some philosophers speak of phenomenal qualities as quantities by talking about them coming in 
degrees/magnitudes (e.g., Byrne 2003; Byrne & Hilbert 2003; Schroer 2010). It is not obvious to 
me that all phenomenal qualities are quantities.  But it does seem very plausible to say that at 4
least some sensory phenomenal qualities are. Pain, for instance, is a mental property that comes 
in fine-grained magnitudes like temperature and mass do. Not only can we speak of one injury 
being more painful than another in the way we speak of one thing being heavier than another, we 
can also sensibly say that, whereas being slapped in the face is just a bit more painful than being 
bitten by a kitten, childbirth is a whole lot more painful than being bitten by a kitten. The legiti-
macy of such claims supports the claim that some phenomenal qualities are quantities, whether 
or not we have an established procedure of measurement. 
 Other cases are a little bit more complicated. As Schroer points out, some phenomenal qual-
ities are composed of multiple quantities; e.g., phenomenal colour is composed of phenomenal 
hue, phenomenal lightness, etc., each of which comes in degrees (2010: section 4). For the sake 
of simplicity, however, I’ll focus on the simple cases where a phenomenal quality is a simple 
quantity in the subsequent discussion. 
 Philosophers who speak of phenomenal qualities in quantity-terms aren’t very explicit about 
their underlying metaphysics of quantity. They don’t seem to be aware of the fact that, if they 
were right to think that some phenomenal qualities are quantities, a proper metaphysics of quan-
tity would have significant impact on our understanding of phenomenology. The primary goal of 
this essay is to explore this uncharted territory. If at least some phenomenal qualities are quanti-
 It is perhaps worth noting that the determinable-determinate relation has nothing to do with the type-to3 -
ken (or universal-particular) distinction. A maximally determinate property of a determinable property is 
still a type or universal that can be instantiated in multiple instances.
 Even if we set the idea of cognitive phenomenology aside, whether or not all non-cognitive phenomenal 4
qualities come in degrees, and are therefore quantities, is debatable. That is why I am making a weaker 
claim here. Among other things, the issue depends on what we think can be represented in our sensory 
experience. I am skeptical, but if, like Siegel (2010), one thinks that our visual experience can have con-
tent about, for instance, causation, and there is a causation-quale for that, such causation-quale does not 
seem to come in degrees, unlike the quale for pain and heat.
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ties, reflecting on the metaphysics of quantities generally gives us a useful cognitive anchor be-
yond our introspection for understanding the metaphysical nature of phenomenology. 
 In the following, I’ll first step away from phenomenology per se to defend a metaphysical 
thesis about the causal profile of magnitudes generally: magnitude instantiations cannot cause 
concept possessions (section 3-5). Then I’ll argue that, given this metaphysics of quantity, and 
that some phenomenal qualities are quantities, the very popular phenomenal concept strategy is 
not available to the physicalists for closing the explanatory gap between the mental and the phys-
ical (section 6-7). 
3 Proportionality Requirement of Causation  5
The world comes in multiple levels of determinacy. I love my omelette brown, but more specifi-
cally, golden-brown, not dark-brown. Being golden-brown is a more determinate way to be 
brown. Magnitudes are determinates of quantities. If we think that there are quantities and mag-
nitudes at all, we are already committed to the metaphysical picture of reality as consisting of 
real layers of determinacy. 
 If we do not want to think that there is extensive causal over-determination, nor that the bot-
tom level of reality monopolizes all the causal work, leaving a huge chunk of reality causally in-
efficacious, we need to be able to think about the levels as competing to do causal work and that 
the non-bottom levels can sometimes win the fight against the bottom level of determinacy. One 
way to get this result is by endorsing a proportionality requirement for causation (see Yablo 
(1997), where proportionality is used to defend the idea of wide mental causation).  6
 Proportionality of causation requires that for an event E1 to be the cause of another event E2, 
E1 has to be at a level of determinacy that is proportional to E2. A cause must neither be too spe-
cific nor be too general with respect to the effect. With this requirement in place, a bottom level 
event can lose out in a causal competition to a non-bottom level event and thereby fail to be a 
cause of an effect that is not at the bottom level. 
 The proportionality requirement can be fleshed out as the conjunction of two counterfactual 
conditions: 
[PR1] If the instantiation of F is a cause of an event e, then: for any property X that is a 
determinable of F, it is not true that, if F were not instantiated but X were, e would still 
have happened. 
[PR2] If the instantiation of F is a cause of an event e, then: for any property X that is a 
determinate of F, if it were true that X (and hence F) were instantiated, e would have 
happened. 
 My thoughts on a layered reality and the proportionality requirement of causation have benefited from 5
comments and discussions with Ross Cameron and Trenton Merricks.
 In Yablo (1992), he argues that determinables and determinates do not compete in doing causal work. 6
They are both causes of an effect (see also Wilson (2009). In Yablo (1997), however, he thinks that there 
is competition. And he argues that wide mental states usually win the competition to be the cause of our 
actions even though the local brain states are still causally relevant.
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 [PR1] ensures that a cause cannot be too specific. If an X which is more general than F 
could guarantee the presence of e without F, then the instantiation of F is just too specific to be 
the cause of e. [PR2] makes sure that a cause cannot be too general. If X is one of the many ways 
in which things can be more specific than being F and X could not guarantee the presence of e, 
then some way of instantiating F could not give us e; so, the instantiation of F is too general to be 
the cause of e.  
 Here is an example to illustrate the idea. Yelling ‘Merry Christmas’ is one among many dif-
ferent ways of yelling, and yelling is a way to make sound. In other words, yelling ‘Merry 
Christmas’ is a property that is a determinate of the property yelling; and the property yelling is, 
in turn, a determinate of the property making sound. And making sound is a determinable of 
yelling, and yelling is a determinable of yelling ‘Merry Christmas’. 
 Now consider the effect that my cat is awakened. Suppose I yelled ‘Merry Christmas’ at it. 
The property yelling ‘Merry Christmas’ is instantiated by me. If it were not instantiated, but the 
more general property yelling remained instantiated (e.g. I might be yelling ‘Happy Halloween’ 
instead), my cat would still be awakened. Since the property yelling is a determinable of the 
property yelling ‘Merry Christmas’, according to [PR1], the instantiation of yelling ‘Merry 
Christmas’ is too specific to cause my cat’s waking. 
 Since I am yelling ‘Merry Christmas’, obviously I instantiate the property making sound as 
well. Yelling ‘Merry Christmas’ is a determinate of the property making sound, so is whispering 
far away from my cat. If I were making sound but only whispering far away from my cat, my cat 
would not have been awakened. Thus, there is a determinate of the property making sound, such 
that if that determinate were instantiated and sound were still made, the effect would not have 
happened. So, according to [PR2], the instantiation of making sound is not specific enough to 
cause my cat’s waking up. 
 In this essay, I take this proportionality requirement for causation to be a basic assumption. 
Some philosophers may find proportionality consideration intuitive, but are only willing to ac-
cept a proportionality constraint about the pragmatics of causal explanation, and not the meta-
physics of causation. Since my motivation for admitting the proportionality requirement is meta-
physical — that there shouldn’t be extensive over-determination and there shouldn’t be a huge 
chunk of reality left causally inefficacious, understanding proportionality in pure pragmatic 
terms wouldn’t answer my metaphysical concern. That is why I take the proportionality require-
ment to be a metaphysical requirement for causation. An event is not a cause at all if it is not a 
proportional cause. 
 What I have just said is certainly not the final word in this discussion. One may have little 
sympathy for my metaphysical motivation. If so, one might prefer a pragmatic understanding of 
the proportionality requirement. One might even feel no intuitive pull from the idea that causa-
tion has to be proportional at all, let alone worry whether the idea should be fleshed out pragmat-
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ically or metaphysically.  But I think that should be a debate for a separate paper. I believe I have 7
said enough to motivate the proportionality requirement as a plausible basic metaphysical as-
sumption. The implication of this metaphysical assumption for our understanding of phenomenal 
consciousness is worth exploring even if one thinks that the truth of the assumption itself can be 
subject to further debate. 
§4 The Causal Profile of Magnitudes 
Since the goal of section 3-5 is to examine whether instantiation of any magnitude can cause our 
concepts, we should remain neutral at this stage for the sake of our inquiry. What I want to do is 
to figure out the reasonable thing to say with respect to the way magnitudes stand in causal rela-
tion with our concepts by giving a closer look at the way magnitudes stand in causal relation 
with other things. Setting the causes of our concepts aside, there is a good inductive reason for 
accepting the following principle: 
[Causal Profile] For any magnitude m, the instantiation of m is not a cause of the in-
stantiation of any property F which is not a magnitude. 
 Let’s consider the following case. Sound is a typical example of quantity. Suppose I am 
asleep. My cat jumps on my bed and meows in my ear. I am awakened. Let’s name the magni-
tude of sound my cat made in my ear s. The question now is, given the proportionality require-
ment, what we should say about the causal profile of s. 
 The exact same reasoning I used in the case of my yelling ‘Merry Christmas’ at my cat ap-
plies. Being noisy is a determinable of s. There are a lot of ways of being noisy, and instantiating 
that exact magnitude of sound s is a way to be noisy. If the magnitude of sound s were not instan-
tiated and being noisy remained instantiated, I would still have been woken up. Thus, according 
to [PR1], the instantiation of s is not a cause of me waking up. For the sake of the proportionality 
requirement ([PR1] specifically), I cannot think of any circumstances in which instantiating s 
specifically causes my waking up. 
 The reasoning is not limited to the property being awakened. Cases where a specific magni-
tude is ruled out by [PR1] as a cause are ubiquitous. When I touched a pan freshly out of the 
oven, my hand was burnt. What caused the injury was the fact that the oven was extremely hot, 
not the very specific temperature of the oven. Of course, the pan instantiated a specific degree of 
temperature when I touched it and got injured. But that does not mean a specific temperature was 
the cause of my injury. The pan also instantiated the determinable property being extremely hot, 
 E.g. Shapiro & Sober (2012) recently argue against both the metaphysical and pragmatic version of the 7
proportionality constraint (what I call a metaphysical requirement here, they call it semantic). But I am 
not convinced by their argument. Shapiro & Sober’s argument seems to require the subjunctive condition-
al claim ‘if not-p, then q’ to mean it is impossible that not-p and q. But that is just false. The subjective 
conditional ‘if not-p, then q’ just means at the nearest possible worlds where not-p, q is also true at those 
worlds. Their counter-examples against proportionality do not seem to work once we agree to evaluate 
subjective conditionals by examining only the nearest possible worlds instead of all possible worlds. In 
any case, this is a debate for another occasion.
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which prevents any maximally determinate way of having temperature from being a proportional 
cause of my injury according to [PR1]. 
 There are plenty of examples where a magnitude fails to qualify as a cause of an event for 
the same reason — [PR1]. It is instructive to observe that both being awakened and being injured 
are properties that are not magnitudes, i.e., not being a maximally determinate way to instantiate 
a property that comes in degrees. The reasoning for the causal limitation of specific magnitudes 
of noise and heat can be generalized and be applied not only to being awakened and being in-
jured, but to any non-magnitude property we encounter. So, we have an inductive reason for 
thinking that there is always a determinable property (e.g., being approximately 100 degrees 
Celsius) that prevents a magnitude (e.g. being 100 degrees Celsius) from being a cause of the 
instantiation of a non-magnitude (e.g. boiling) due to [PR1]. 
 One might question my inductive argument with the following example. Suppose I am tied 
to a machine which is designed to slap me if and only if I speak at a specific magnitude of loud-
ness m. If I speak at the volume m and I am slapped by the machine, it seems to be the case that 
it is the instantiation of m, which is a magnitude, that proportionally causes me to be slapped. 
And being slapped is a non-magnitude property. So, it seems that the instantiation of magnitude 
can cause the instantiation of non-magnitude after all.  8
 First of all, I do not think we can find an actual case like that. No matter how hard we try to 
fine-tune our machine, I bet we won’t be able to calibrate the machine so finely for it to be re-
sponsive to the instantiation of m specifically so that it wouldn’t slap me had I spoken at any 
slightly different volume. More importantly, if the point of the objection is not that we can find 
actual cases of magnitude causing non-magnitude to be instantiated but only that such a case is 
conceivable, then I believe the objection is missing the point of my inductive argument. If I ar-
gue inductively that all apples are red based on my experiences with apples, one cannot chal-
lenge the inductive argument simply by imagining a black apple. [Causal Profile] is a claim 
about actuality. And my inductive argument is only meant to show that [Causal Profile] is true of 
the actual world. What else is conceivable is irrelevant. 
 Setting the causes of our concepts aside for the sake of our inquiry, for all the cases that we 
can expect to come across actually, as long as a property is not a magnitude, the instantiation of 
that property will not be caused by the instantiation of a magnitude, which will always be pre-
empted by a determinable according to the requirement that causation has to be proportional. 
Thus, we have a good inductive reason to think that [Causal Profile] is true. As a result, we have 
a good reason for believing that, if having a concept is not to instantiate a magnitude, the instan-
tiations of magnitude do not cause our possession of concepts. 
5 What Causes Our Concepts Not?  9
Having m (where m is a concept) is a mental property that people instantiate. Whereas having a 
sensory representation is to be in a sensory phenomenal state, which is arguably a magnitude, 
 I would like to thank Brie Gertler for pressing me very hard on this point.8
 I couldn’t emphasize enough how much this section benefits from the wonderful mix of encouraging 9
comments and razor-sharp objections from Harold Langsam.
  !  of !7 16
having a concept is not a magnitude. For example, having the concept of rabbit is not a magni-
tude of some quantity that a person instantiates. There probably are experts about rabbits who 
can deploy the concept of rabbit better than others and such competence comes in degrees. But 
that does not mean that having the concept rabbit is a degree of instantiating some quantity. 
 One might protest: It depends on the content of the concept! Of course having a concept is 
not a magnitude if we are talking about the concept of rabbit. But if a concept m represents a 
magnitude, the property having the concept m would itself be a magnitude too. To give a con-
crete example, it might be argued that, since the concept <being 10 kg> represents the magnitude 
being 10 kg, the mental property having the concept <being 10 kg> is itself a mental 
magnitude.  10
 The claim if a concept m represents a magnitude, then having the concept itself would be a 
magnitude is not well-motivated. Magnitudes must be magnitudes of quantities. Setting concept 
possession aside, for any magnitude q we come across in everyday life, we can tell which quanti-
ty q is supposed to be a magnitude of. So, it is plausible to think that, if there is a property p such 
that we cannot tell which quantity p is a magnitude of, p is not a magnitude. There is no quantity 
such that having a concept is a degree of that quantity. Since we cannot tell what quantity having 
m is a magnitude of, we have good (albeit defeasible) reason to conclude that having m is not a 
magnitude. When I have the concept <being 10 kg>, instantiating this mental property is not to 
instantiate a degree of any property that I can think of. 
 One may respond by suggesting that having the concept <mass> is a mental property which 
is a quantity with the property having the concept <being 10 kg> as magnitude. So, in a similar 
way, as long as m is a concept for a magnitude, there is a quantity of which having m is a magni-
tude after all. 
 The problem with this response is that I have both the concept <being 10 kg> and the con-
cept <being 100 kg> at the same time. That is, the same subject — namely I — instantiates the 
mental property having the concept <being 10 kg> and the mental property having the concept 
<being 100 kg> at the same time. If these two properties are meant to be magnitudes of the one 
quantity as the objection implies, we are in deep trouble. This is because we have one thing that 
instantiates more than one degree — in fact all degrees — of a quantity at the same time. And it 
is not as if the self has infinitely many parts which can instantiate all these mental properties sep-
arately. This is as absurd as saying that I instantiate all possible weights. Therefore, having the 
concept <being 10 kg> is not a magnitude of having the concept <mass>. 
 Finally, it has been suggested to me that I have overlooked the distinction between simple 
and complex quantities (and hence the distinction between simple and complex magnitudes). For 
example, temperature is a simple quantity; it just comes in various degrees. Colour, however, is a 
complex quantity in the sense that it is composed of multiple quantities: brightness, hue, satura-
tion. Having a concept is presumably grounded upon a brain state, which consists of a network of 
electric activations in a certain area of our brain. This network of activation is composed of all 
the local activations. And these local electric activations are instantiations of magnitudes. So, it 
might be argued, just like a particular shade of colour, having a concept is a complex magnitude.  
 I use <x> to signify the concept of x. And italic is reserved for properties, e.g., being massive.10
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 We should be careful to note that the quantities hue, saturation, and brightness form the 
complex quantity colour by fusing together as different dimensions of one quantity. Colour is not 
formed by putting an instantiation of a magnitude of hue next to an instantiation of a magnitude 
of brightness (whatever that even means). That, however, is exactly what’s going on in the brain 
case: neural activations are linked next to each other to form a pattern. What we have in the case 
of brain activation networks is not a case of simple quantities fusing to form a complex quantity 
— it is a case of multiple quantity instantiations being connected next to each other. Hence, the 
fact that concept possessions are grounded upon networks of brain activation does not imply that 
having a concept is a complex magnitude like the colours. 
 None of the apparent objections work. Thus, I conclude that having a concept is not to in-
stantiate a magnitude. Together with [Causal Profile], we can conclude that our concepts are be-
yond the causal range of magnitude instantiations. Our conceptual apparatus is simply not 
causally sensitive to any specific degree of a quantity. Why should we care? Here is one reason: 
if Byrne et al. are right to think that at least some phenomenal qualities are quantities, this meta-
physics of quantity leads to a serious problem for physicalism about phenomenal consciousness. 
6 Phenomenal Qualities as Quantities Revisited 
If a phenomenal quality is to be understood as a quantity, we should conceptualize it like we con-
ceptualize other quantities. To avoid confusion, it is better to separate the quantity from the mag-
nitudes of the quantity in the same way we distinguish the quantity temperature and the degrees 
of temperature. Take pain as an example again. Pain is a quantity that comes in various degrees 
of painful feelings. Let us call the quantity itself a phenomenal quality and the degrees or magni-
tudes of the quantity phenomenal feelings. So, the phenomenal feelings are determinates of a 
phenomenal quality. 
 I have argued that magnitudes of a quantity are maximally determinate properties of the 
quantity. For instance, an object that is very heavy and is 100 kg does not thereby have two mag-
nitudes of mass. Both being very heavy and being 100 kg are ways to have mass; and the object 
instantiates both mass-related properties. Nonetheless, the object has only one magnitude of 
mass, namely, the maximally determinate way to have mass, being 100 kg.  11
 Now we take certain phenomenal feelings to be degrees or magnitudes of phenomenal qual-
ities. So, based on what we have said about magnitudes in general, we ought to say that those 
phenomenal feelings are maximally determinate ways of instantiating their respective phenome-
nal qualities too. Accordingly, when we feel pain, although we could have felt a different degree 
of pain, we could not have been more determinately painful than the way we feel it. What we 
feel when we are in pain is always a maximally determinate way to be in pain. 
 If there is any lingering doubt (which is probably a philosopher’s second nature), we can 
always run an argument that is parallel to the one that supports treating magnitudes of mass as 
maximally determinate ways to have mass. When I break my leg, I instantiate multiple pain-re-
lated mental properties: E.g. being very painful, being more than slightly painful, being at level 7 
pain, etc. All these pain-related properties are ways to instantiate pain, only different in terms of 
 Notice that being 100.1 kg is not a more determinate way to have mass. It is a different maximally de11 -
terminate way to have mass.
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determinacy. And I instantiate them all. Nonetheless, I feel just one pain. Suppose a doctor asks 
me how painful my broken leg is. It would be nonsensical for me to respond by asking, ‘Which 
pain?’ There is just one. And the metaphysics of phenomenal character should respect our phe-
nomenal introspection. So, for all the instantiated mental properties lining up in a determinable-
determinate hierarchy of pain, only one can be identified as the mental property that is my 
painful feeling when I break my leg. 
 Here’s a question: which among all the properties in the determinable-determinate hierarchy 
of pain should be identified as the painful feeling? The only principled and plausible choice 
would be the maximally determinate one.  12
 I cannot emphasize enough that none of what I just said is to deny that the non-maximal de-
terminates of being in pain (e.g., being very painful) are mental properties. They are mental 
properties too. (You might even call them phenomenal properties if you like.) They simply aren’t 
the subjective feelings, which are maximally determinate. A property doesn’t have to be a feeling 
to be mental. For example, being very painful and being more than slightly painful are surely 
additional mental properties which I instantiate along with and in virtue of the magnitude of 
pain I feel when I break my leg,  but being very painful and being more than slightly painful are 13
not extra feelings over and above the very magnitude of pain I feel. 
 This is how all quantities and magnitudes work. I am simply running exactly the same kind 
of argument I ran for quantities like mass or temperature on the phenomenal qualities that come 
in fine-grained degrees. If the argument makes sense in those cases, it should make sense here. 
So, if a phenomenal quality comes in degrees, what we feel subjectively are magnitudes of such a 
quality, namely, maximally determinate ways to instantiate such a quality. 
7 Magnitudes and Phenomenal Concepts 
Philosophers refer to some of our subjective phenomenal feelings as magnitudes casually. Now 
that we have a better sense of how to conceptualize some of our phenomenology as quantities, 
we are in a position to see how the metaphysical thesis about a causal barrier between magni-
tudes and concepts can inform the way we understand our phenomenology. As a case study, I 
will focus on how the causal barrier restricts the physicalists’ options in responding to Jackson’s 
(1982) Knowledge Argument for dualism. And I assume a basic familiarity with the Knowledge 
Argument here. 
 There are various physicalist attempts to defuse the Knowledge Argument. And the phe-
nomenal concept strategy is one of the widely accepted approaches. The basic idea of the strate-
 One alternative suggestion that has been presented to me is, although there is only one pain that I feel, 12
which property in the determinable-determinate hierarchy my phenomenal feeling is depends on the atten-
tion of the pain sufferer. An undesirable consequence of this suggestion is that it seems we have to say 
that as long as I am not paying attention, I will feel just a pain determinable while there are some more 
specific pains that I instantiate without feeling them. Furthermore, it also seems to me that whether a 
mental property is a phenomenal feeling or not should be intrinsic to that mental property and not subject 
to contingencies like shift of attention. I think the way I model phenomenal feelings upon magnitudes like 
temperatures gives us a very neat way to organize all the intuitions we have about phenomenal feelings.
 Notice that this talk of ‘additional mental properties’ does not contradict the fact that we instantiate be13 -
ing very painful in virtue of instantiating a magnitude of pain.
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gy is that there are two kinds of concept we use to refer to our phenomenal feelings, and one of 
them (the phenomenal concepts) cannot be acquired or possessed by a person unless she has ac-
tually experienced the relevant phenomenal feeling. Since the co-extensionality of the two kinds 
of concept is not a priori knowable, we have the misleading intuition that Mary learns something 
new about the world after seeing something red for the first time. But what really happened was 
that Mary acquired a new concept to refer to something she has known of already. 
 A very popular way to employ the phenomenal concept strategy, first developed by Loar 
(1990), is to say that the phenomenal concepts are a kind of mental demonstrative (e.g. ‘that 
colour experience’). To address the apparent richness of our grasp of phenomenology, advocates 
of the strategy sometimes beef up the demonstrative phenomenal concepts by adding extra com-
ponents or extra descriptive content to them (e.g., Block 2002; Levine 2007; Schroer 2010). But 
the crucial element remains constant: such concepts are taken to be at least partly demonstra-
tives. Due to the nature of demonstratives in general, the (colour) phenomenal concepts are such 
that Mary could not have acquired them without actually having run into colour experiences.  14
That is why Mary could not possibly have the related phenomenal concepts before she first actu-
ally had real visual experience of colour. 
 Certainly, from time to time, we seem to be able to have mental demonstratives about things 
we have not encountered; but, as Levine (2010) convincingly argued, those are more likely to be 
cases of disguised mental definite descriptions instead of genuine demonstratives. For example, 
when I think about that woman who will be my future wife, I seem to be entertaining a mental 
demonstrative. But if in fact I have not met her yet, it is plausible to say I am in fact just thinking 
about the woman who will be my future wife. And the thought is not really a demonstrative. So, 
if phenomenal concepts are demonstratives of some sort, one needs to have had the relevant ex-
perience and have encountered the referents of the demonstratives to have the concepts at one’s 
disposal. If the epistemic intuition that drives the Knowledge Argument is jointly produced by (i) 
the nature of such demonstrative phenomenal concepts and (ii) the fact that we cannot know a 
priori that these demonstrative concepts are co-extensive with certain neurological concepts 
about brain states, we do not have an argument for dualism as a metaphysical doctrine. 
 This is a very rough characterization of the strategy, but the key point is this: for the strategy 
to work, demonstrative concepts referring to phenomenal feelings must be possible. But if my 
metaphysical thesis about the causal barrier between magnitudes and concepts is true, the physi-
calists have good reason to think that we don’t have such kind of concept about our phenomenal 
feelings. Here is why. 
 There are two kinds of demonstrative concepts: the simple ones and the complex ones. I can 
entertain the thought <that is tasty>, which involves a simple mental demonstrative, and also the 
thought <that bagel is tasty>, which involves a complex mental demonstrative. A simple demon-
strative is an indispensable component of a complex demonstrative. A complex demonstrative of 
something is impossible if a simple demonstrative about that thing is impossible. If I can’t think 
of something as that, I can’t think of it as that bagel. 
 Phenomenal concepts understood in this way are also called recognitional concepts in the literature. For 14
other defenders of this approach, see Tye (2003) and Caruthers (2004). Tye now renounces the phenome-
nal concept strategy (2009).
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 The phenomenal concept strategy is a physicalist argument. So, we should review the situa-
tion through the physicalist lens. (Sometimes this requirement is neglected.) In particular, the 
reference of at least our simple concepts should supervene on something naturalistic, presumably 
causal, about the relation between our concepts and the referents of the concept (that can be a 
potential causal relation under (evolutionarily) relevant situations).  If our conceptual resources 15
are causally insulated from something, we would not be able to have simple concepts referring to 
those things. 
 Simple demonstrative concepts are simple concepts. If the phenomenal concepts are taken to 
be at least partly demonstrative concepts, and if we cannot have a demonstrative concept of 
something that we cannot have a simple demonstrative of, our demonstrative concepts and our 
phenomenal feelings must be able to stand in causal relation in order to establish the reference so 
that we can have the kind of demonstrative concepts the phenomenal concept strategy needs, as 
an advocate of the phenomenal concept strategy freely admits: 
The denotation of a phenomenal type-demonstrative will be the property — presumably 
physical — that’s causally responsible for the application of that concept in the intro-
spective recognition or re-identification of an experience as ‘that (kind) again’ or ‘anoth-
er of those’. (Levin 2007: 89; her italics, my bolds) 
 Since some of the phenomenal feelings we instantiate are magnitudes, there is a causal bar-
rier between such phenomenal feelings and non-magnitudes due to the proportionality require-
ment of causation. For any magnitude of pain, there is always a determinable, e.g., being very 
painful, that prevents the magnitude of pain from being a proportional cause of the instantiation 
of any non-magnitude (e.g., yelling). Therefore, based on what we have said about concept pos-
session, there is a causal barrier between some of our phenomenal feelings and our concepts. 
 The causal barrier between the magnitudes and our conceptual resources would then imply 
that there can actually be no simple demonstrative concepts about those phenomenal feelings that 
are magnitudes. Hence, there can’t be complex demonstratives about them as well. For that rea-
son, no demonstrative concept can refer to such kind of phenomenal feeling from the physicalist 
perspective. The phenomenal concept strategy is not a viable physicalist response to the 
dualists.  16
 The usual thought is that once the reference of simple concepts is naturalized, we can explain reference 15
of complex concepts with compositionality. For examples of attempts to naturalize simple mental repre-
sentations, see Dretske (1981; 1988), Fodor (1987), Rupert (1999; 2001), Price (2001), Ryder (2004), etc.
 Notice that this does not imply that phenomenal feelings have no causal power. Given what I have ar16 -
gued in this essay, my pain can still cause my enemy’s pleasure (or my sadness) — for pleasure (or sad-
ness) is a quantity that comes in degrees. And causal relations among various quantities appear to be ex-
actly the kind of thing mathematical laws of nature purport to capture. I will leave causation among mag-
nitudes of different quantities for another occasion. Neither does my argument imply that we cannot think 
about our phenomenal feelings at all; even a physicalist should not think that mental reference can only be 
established by a causal relation between a mental representation (e.g., a concept) and the referent. My 
argument only challenges the possibility of demonstratives about our phenomenal feelings.
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 Note that my proportionality argument does not preclude demonstratives of, say, the deter-
minable being very painful (instead of the maximally determinate way of being in pain). One 
might even include demonstratives of such determinables under the label ‘phenomenal 
concepts’, as Loar himself does (1990: section 10). But as I have argued extensively already in 
section 6, to respect the introspective datum that I feel only one pain, the less determinate mental 
property being very painful should not be considered identical to the painful feeling I instantiate 
— the subjective feeling of pain I instantiate is a maximally determinate mental property. Hence, 
a demonstrative about the less determinate mental property isn’t a phenomenal concept that de-
notes what I subjectively feel when I am in pain. We need to keep in mind that the phenomenal 
concept strategy is supposed to use the idea of co-extensive concepts to explain away the appar-
ent gap between the physical and the subjective feeling. And a point crucial to the strategy is the 
idea that we have two different kinds of concepts that refer to the same thing — our subjective 
feeling which is also a certain kind of brain state (by the physicalists’ light). So, for the purpose 
of the strategy, the kind of demonstrative concepts involved ought to be about my subjective 
feeling. Bringing in less determinate demonstrative concepts about mental states that are not our 
subjective feelings, even if we choose to label these less determinate demonstrative concepts 
‘phenomenal concepts’, would not help address the apparent explanatory gap between the physi-
cal and the subjective feelings, as far as the phenomenal concept strategy is concerned. 
8 Physicalist Resistance  17
According to my central claim, magnitude instantiations are too determinate to be proportional 
causes of demonstrative concepts for us to have demonstrative concepts about magnitudes. My 
explanation, as it is applied specifically to this case, can be captured by the following claim: 
[*] When a magnitude x is instantiated and I generate the demonstrative concept <this 
magnitude>, that same concept would have been generated just the same had a deter-
minable of x remained instantiated but the specific magnitude x failed to be instantiated 
(i.e., had a slightly different magnitude been instantiated instead). 
A physicalist may try to reject this claim by saying that, had a slightly different magnitude been 
instantiated, a different concept would have been generated. 
 On what basis can our physicalist insist that a different concept would have been generated 
had a slightly different magnitude been instantiated? I suppose the reasoning is that the reference 
of a demonstrative concept is established by what causes it; if a slightly different magnitude is 
instantiated, it would be a different cause that leads to a different demonstrative concept. Notice 
that this argument goes through only if we assume that it is the magnitude that causes the con-
cept; only by assuming that we can infer that the concept would be caused by something else 
(instead of by the same determinable) had a different magnitude been instantiated. 
 Now, with this observation, I’m not thereby suggesting that the physicalist pushback begs 
the question against me. I suppose that would be an uncharitable reading of what our physicalist 
 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing some of the potential objections in this sec17 -
tion to my attention.
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is getting at. Instead, I take her message to be that, since [*] cannot be true if magnitude instanti-
ations can cause demonstratives, using [*] in my argument requires me to already have assumed 
that magnitude instantiations cannot cause demonstratives. It seems that I am begging the ques-
tion. 
 It isn’t always straightforward to determine (if there is even a fact of the matter) who is 
begging the question against whom. If I argue against q based on p, and if my argument is valid 
at all, of course my premise p would not be true if q is true. That alone shouldn’t indicate that 
I’m begging the question. Here is why my argument isn’t begging the question. 
 Notice that [*] is strictly speaking not a premise I began with. Instead, as I said at the be-
ginning of section 4, ‘[w]hat I want to do is to figure out the reasonable thing to say with respect 
to the way magnitudes stand in causal relation with our concepts by giving a closer look at the 
way magnitudes stand in causal relation with other things.’ By suspending my judgment — 
hence not begging the question against anyone — about whether magnitude instantiations stand 
in causal relation with concept possession, I looked into other cases and obtained the general 
principle [Causal Profile] by induction. From that general principle, I can infer something like 
[*], which goes on to tell us something about the nature of our phenomenal concepts. 
 Our physicalist can of course refuse to suspend the judgment with me and insist that the 
possession of mental demonstratives is a special case (i.e., rejecting [*]). On that bases, she flips 
my modus ponens for [*] into a modus tollens against [Causal Profile]. But one can always do 
that for any argument. Without a further independent reason for rejecting [*], this alone cannot 
be a legitimate objection to my argument. (Again, the physicalist pushback I’m considering is a 
piece of reasoning that relies on rejecting [*]; it is not a reason for rejecting [*].) 
 In addition to all that, it’s also illuminating to consider what follows if one rejects [*] and 
embraces the view that our demonstratives can be caused by and thereby refer to individual 
magnitudes. Quantities come in very fine-grained degrees. Take a bath full of water as an exam-
ple. Suppose I feel the water and say to myself ‘this temperature is hot enough.’ It takes time to 
entertain the thought. And it isn’t crazy to think that the temperature of the water fluctuates 
slightly in that period even if the fluctuation is too small for me to sense. By our physicalist’s 
own light, it seems that she has to say that I entertain a series of fluctuating thoughts with a se-
ries of distinct demonstrative concepts when I say to myself ‘this temperature is hot enough’ be-
cause of the fluctuating magnitudes.  All things being equal, I find this way of characterizing the 18
scenario implausible. I don’t mean to present this as additional evidence for [*]. But this certain-
ly adds significant weight to my earlier claim that our physicalist needs independent reason for 
rejecting [*] instead of simply insisting that demonstratives about magnitudes are exceptions to 
my induction. 
 Alternatively, can our physicalist say that, by arguing that there are no demonstrative phe-
nomenal concepts, I have concluded that there is no epistemic gap? Here’s the thought. The epis-
temic gap is about a gap between our thoughts about the phenomenal and our thoughts about the 
 Of course, one can stipulate that I have a demonstrative concept that refers to the average temperature 18
in that period. But such stipulations are made purely on pragmatic grounds. There is no epistemic reason 
for thinking that a demonstrative concept <this temperature> is about the average temperature instead of 
the average plus 0.001 degree Fahrenheit.
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physical — that we cannot infer the former from the latter. So, there is no epistemic gap between 
the phenomenal feelings and the physical if we can’t have thoughts about the former. Since I 
have argued that the phenomenal feelings are maximally determinate and that we can’t have 
demonstrative phenomenal concepts about such phenomenal feelings, there can be no epistemic 
gap related to the phenomenal feelings if we can’t think about them. If the problem of an epis-
temic gap that haunts the physicalists could arise only for less determinate phenomenal proper-
ties, then the physicalists actually have no problem at all. In other words, I have thrown out the 
physicalist solution to the dualist problem along with the dualist problem itself. Far from being a 
problem for the physicalists, this is in fact a win for them. 
 Intuitively, there’s an epistemic gap between our thoughts about what it is like to have a cer-
tain experience and our thoughts about brain states. We cannot obtain one from the other a pri-
ori. This is the epistemic intuition that fuels the Knowledge Argument. There are different ways 
to flesh out this epistemic intuition in order to explain it. One might appeal to the different kinds 
of object — physical vs. phenomenal properties — that our concepts can be about. That is what 
the dualists think we should do. Alternatively one might appeal to the different kinds of concept 
that we can have about the same objects. The phenomenal concept strategy takes the latter ap-
proach and, on top of that, tries to explain the special features that the what-it-is-like of our expe-
rience appears to have in terms of the special features of demonstrative concepts.  
 Here are two things that I didn’t argue against. First of all, I didn't argue against the intuition 
of an epistemic gap. Arguing that one cannot describe and explain the intuition the way many 
physicalists thought they can is not to argue that the intuition isn’t there or that it need not be ex-
plained. Secondly, I didn’t argue against fleshing out the intuition in terms of different kinds of 
concept. My argument leaves it open for us to choose whether we decide to flesh out the epis-
temic intuition in terms of the differences in object-types or in terms of the differences in con-
cept-types. I only argue that we cannot think about magnitudes with demonstratives — a specific 
kind of concept whose references must be fixed causally by physicalist light. Hence, I didn’t ar-
gue that we cannot think about phenomenal feelings, just not with demonstratives. Unless the 
advocates of the phenomenal concept strategy refuses to acknowledge that there are other ways 
to flesh out and explain the intuitive epistemic gap, my argument against their way shouldn’t be 
understood as an argument that undercuts the dualist problem because the epistemic gap between 
our thoughts about the phenomenal and our thoughts about the physical is still there to be ex-
plained. 
 Finally, given that we appear to refer to our phenomenal feelings with demonstratives quite 
often, one might consider what I have just said to be an objection to physicalism about mental 
representation. One can take it that way (which will then be a separate argument against physi-
calism), but one does not have to. And I don’t. I remain neutral on that issue, at least in this es-
say. There are a lot of things a physicalist can say even if she grants everything I have just said 
about our mental demonstratives. She might think that, like a lot of our thoughts in everyday life, 
apparent demonstratives about phenomenal feelings should not be taken literally; instead, they 
are just a pretense of demonstrative thoughts for pragmatic purposes. The only point I want to 
make is this: It seems right that at least some phenomenal qualities are quantities; if so, a proper 
metaphysics of quantity implies that there are no physicalism-friendly demonstrative concepts 
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about phenomenal feelings for the phenomenal concept strategy to work. This is not a problem 
that can be fixed simply by beefing up the phenomenal concepts.  19
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